Diagnosis Coding Creep for Medicare Patients: Does It Exist? by Tate, Deann Wood
Medical University of South Carolina 
MEDICA 
MUSC Theses and Dissertations 
2018 
Diagnosis Coding Creep for Medicare Patients: Does It Exist? 
Deann Wood Tate 
Medical University of South Carolina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://medica-musc.researchcommons.org/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Tate, Deann Wood, "Diagnosis Coding Creep for Medicare Patients: Does It Exist?" (2018). MUSC Theses 
and Dissertations. 302. 
https://medica-musc.researchcommons.org/theses/302 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by MEDICA. It has been accepted for inclusion in 








DIAGNOSIS CODING CREEP FOR MEDICARE PATIENTS: DOES IT EXIST? 
 
By 









A doctoral project submitted to the faculty of the Medical University of South Carolina in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
Doctor of Health Administration 
in the College of Health Professions 
 
 







I would like to thank the Chair of my Doctoral Project Committee, Dr. Kit 
Simpson, and Committee Members, Dr. Trudie Milner and Dr. Sarah Kramer, for their 
advice and guidance throughout this project and for being excellent role models for 
servant leadership. 
Thank you to my husband, John Tate, who has endured and supported my dream 
of becoming a lifelong learner; to my mother Gerry Woods, who introduced me to the 
exciting field of healthcare when I was a toddler; and to my aunts, Joyce Woods and 
Gayle Carroll, who encouraged me to pursue this degree when I thought I was finished 
with school. 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this project to my late father, William F. Woods, 
who loved to read almost as much as I do and who would have been incredibly happy to 
share in this rewarding experience. 
iv 
 
Abstract of Doctoral Project Presented to the 
Executive Doctoral Program in Health Administration & Leadership 
Medical University of South Carolina 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Health Administration 
 
 




Deann Woods Tate 
 
 
Chairperson: Kit N. Simpson, DrPH 




Medicare uses a risk adjustment model to prospectively determine expenses for Part C 
(Medicare Advantage) beneficiaries; this provides a financial incentive to report higher 
diagnosis code specificity in order to receive greater reimbursement. There has been little 
published research on diagnosis coding variation in physician practices, and the number 
of Medicare Advantage patients continues to rise. This study seeks to determine if ICD-9-
CM code specificity for chronic kidney disease, hypertension and diabetes treated in 
physician office visits increased after the creation of the Hierarchical Condition Category 
payment methodology for Medicare patients in 2004. A retrospective review of claims 
data from MEDPAR’s and MarketScan® was conducted and showed increased 
specificity for chronic kidney disease and diabetes in both data sets over a four year 
period. However, the Medicare 5% sample revealed a decrease in specificity for 
hypertension during the same time frame in contrast to the MarketScan® sample. Further 
research is needed on coding accuracy and reasons for increased diagnosis code 
specificity in the physician office setting. 
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 Physician reimbursement in the United States changed significantly when Medicare Part 
B was implemented in 1965. Earlier insurance plans such as Blue Shield paid patients for 
covered events, with the understanding they were to reimburse their physician for the care 
received  (Morrisey, 2014).  Medicare paid physicians based on a profile of “usual, customary, 
and reasonable” fees (Preskitt, 2008). The Health Maintenance Act of 1973 added managed care 
and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to the health care vocabulary with the goal of 
increasing the quality of care while decreasing costs (Preskitt, 2008). Unfortunately, HMOs 
never reached the predicted level of popularity, and in 1989 the resource-based relative value 
scale (RBRVS) became the new basis for the Medicare fee schedule (Berenson & Rich, 2010). 
These fee for service (FFS) models were established at a time when health care focused on 
treating acute illnesses and were less effective when it came to managing chronic conditions.  
 Under the new methodology, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) pay 
for Medicare Part B beneficiary care based on CPT codes representing the volume and intensity 
of services rendered. This contrasts with inpatient hospital reimbursement, which is tied to 
diagnosis codes. Medicare Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage (MA), was created in 
1982 through the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act as an alternative to traditional 






Risk adjustment (RA) began with the Medicare prospective payment system in 1983, 
when diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) based on International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 
codes were utilized to reimburse hospitals (Quinn, 2014). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
required adjustments to capitation payments according to health status, and after the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003, CMS implemented an RA methodology for MA patients. Physician 
practices fully incorporated RA in 2007 with the creation of Hierarchical Condition Categories 
(Kronick & Welch, 2014).  
HCCs are a form of RA used for MA patients, based on diagnosis codes, which portray 
the complexity of the patient in order to estimate future health care expenditures (Yeatts & 
Sangvai, 2016). Under the HCC model, CMS calculates a risk score based on patient 
demographics such as age, sex, and geographic location as well as the health status of the patient. 
Higher risk scores represent more complex patients, which leads to higher payments to the plan. 
The ICD is a commonly used nosology, or systematic classification of diseases, for 
reimbursement, administration, epidemiology and health services research (O’Malley et al., 
2005). ICD-9-CM was the diagnosis code set utilized when CMS introduced HCCs. The 10th 
iteration of ICD was adopted by the United States in 2014 and contains over 68,000 codes used 
to identify patient diagnoses in the inpatient and outpatient setting. In addition to reimbursement, 
ICD codes are also used to study patterns of disease, treatment and outcomes in an effort to 








While RA addresses patient enrollment concerns by discouraging insurance carriers from 
only enrolling healthy patients, it also provides financial incentive to report as many diagnoses as 
possible (Kronick & Welch, 2014). Failing to report a diagnosis code at the highest level of 
specificity does not adequately capture the patient’s risk and could lead to reduced 
reimbursement (Yeatts & Sangvai, 2016). Upcoding and DRG creep are synonyms for a 
phenomenon which was first noted when hospitals realized the potential effects of coding on 
their organization’s financial health. These are not limited to the hospital setting, however.  
Intentional upcoding in physician practices has typically involved coding a higher level 
of evaluation and management service than documentation supports, which is rewarded under 
the FFS payment model. However, as a result of the potential for increased reimbursement, MA 
plans have increased their efforts to influence physicians to change their diagnosis coding 
patterns (Geruso & Layton, 2015). Software vendors and consultants aggressively market 
expensive technology and HCC education with promises of capturing millions of dollars through 
coding optimization. 
The number of MA enrollees continues to rise, and CMS intends to tie 50% of all 





Figure 1: Enrollment in Medicare Advantage Plans Steadily Increased Since 2004 
(https://www.kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage/) 
 
Kronick (2017) estimates the increase in coding intensity, which is the difference 
between the beneficiaries’ scores and the scores they would have if enrolled in MA, may lead to 
an increase in Medicare expenditures of approximately $200 billion over the next 10 years. The 
relevant question is whether MA risk scores, primarily influenced by diagnosis coding, are 
systematically different from those of traditional Medicare patients (Kronick & Welch, 2014). 
The Center for Public Integrity reports overpayments related to inaccurate risk scores 
have cost Americans tens of billions of dollars already (Schulte, 2016). Government audits began 
to increase with the realization misclassification is a potential danger to federal health care 
reimbursement programs. Coding accuracy is a great concern to the health care industry for more 
than financial reasons alone. Reliance on inaccurate ICD codes may lead to clinical decision-
making which is not evidence-based and may impact not only health care costs, but quality of 




Research on coding quality typically focuses on hospitals, so further studies of physician 
practice coding accuracy are warranted to identify variations between the two types of Medicare 
payment systems: FFS and RA. Both models provide unanticipated incentives to “upcode,” or 
report codes misrepresenting the patient’s acuity for financial benefit. Litigation related to 
fraudulent reporting of diagnosis codes for financial gain has thus far focused on health plans 
and alleged upcoding, but physician liability should also be a concern.  
Problem Statement 
 There has been little published research on diagnosis coding variation in physician 
practices; most reviews have focused on hospital DRG upcoding. This study seeks to determine 
if ICD-9-CM specificity for office visits increased after the implementation of the HCC risk 
adjustment payment methodology for Medicare patients in 2004. 
Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis: ICD-9-CM code selection specificity for chronic medical conditions treated 









REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The objective of this literature review is to investigate the existing knowledge on 
variation in diagnosis code specificity as a result of physician reimbursement changes. The 
articles selected for this review were obtained using PubMed, Ovid MEDLINE, Academic 
Search Premier and Business Search Premier as the search engines. The following keywords 
were used: ICD-9, coding accuracy, upcoding, outpatient, and risk adjustment. The inclusion 
criteria were: articles published between 2004 and 2015, available in the English language, from 
peer-reviewed journals.  Additional articles identified from the bibliographies of available 
studies were reviewed. 
Importance of Coding Accuracy 
 Using diagnosis codes submitted to payers as a method of illustrating patient acuity is 
only effective if the codes are correctly assigned. Fisher et al. (1992) noted coding of non-
clinical data was highly accurate but diagnoses and procedures were less reliable. Their re-
analysis of the 1987 National DRG Validation Study uncovered wide variation in diagnosis 
coding, leading to the conclusion claims-based hospital data should be interpreted with caution 
(Fisher et al., 1992).  
 Lorence and Ibrahim (2003) noted the problem of inconsistency in judgments derived 
from inconsistent coding data as well as the potential for unclaimed reimbursement, or 




referenced prior studies’ identification of up to 18.6% of payments based on incorrect hospital 
ICD-9-CM coding, resulting mostly in overpayments. In addition, an OIG audit revealed a 5% 
increase in incorrect physician payments due to insufficient documentation and $4.1 billion in 
incorrect payments to acute care hospitals (Lorence & Ibrahim, 2003).  
Types and Causes of Errors 
 Coding errors occur when the ICD or CPT code chosen does not match the medical 
record documentation. Unbundling errors, which occur when different components of a 
diagnosis are reported separately rather than using a combination code, may be unintentional or 
deliberate (O’Malley et al., 2005). Other diagnosis coding errors include: incorrect ICD 
category; lack of diagnosis specificity (unspecified code selected when more information is 
available); and too much specificity (documentation supports an unspecified code). Causes of 
diagnosis code errors include: insufficient coding knowledge; lack of coding experience; poorly 
developed EHR skills, haste, incomplete or vague documentation, and desire to meet medical 
necessity requirements for diagnostic tests. 
 O’Malley et al. (2005) cautioned some errors may be specific to the setting because of 
differences in coding processes between inpatient and ambulatory. They differentiated between 
errors along the patient trajectory and along the paper trail. A potential source of error lies in the 
clinician’s description of the diagnosis and his or her clarity in recording the diagnosis, 
highlighting the impact of evolving medical knowledge, existence of multiple synonyms for one 
clinical condition and common legibility concerns in paper charting (O’Malley et al., 2005). 
Rangachari (2007) noted the majority of coding errors are caused by inadequate physician 




is known to be incomplete and variable, and coding intensity has been found to vary 
geographically (Kronick & Welch, 2014). 
 Lorence and Ibrahim (2003) studied errors in practice settings and concluded disparities 
exist between settings, management level and geographic regions. The best coding accuracy rates 
were found in the West North Central states and overall poorer coding in organizations with a 
larger volume of outpatient visits. The researchers concluded coding is influenced by individual 
biases and practice patterns despite standardization of coding systems. 
 Another potential impact on diagnosis coding is variation in diagnostic practices. Song et 
al. (2010) found Medicare beneficiaries residing in regions of the United States with higher 
intensity of services were associated with higher reported prevalence of chronic diseases, which 
may be due to higher rates of diagnostic testing or to differences in health status. 
Professional fee coding education has traditionally focused on procedure codes rather 
than diagnoses, because Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes have been the driver of 
reimbursement. Secondary diagnoses are frequently omitted because there is no financial reason 
to include them (Kronick, 2017). In physician offices, coding may be performed by a physician 
or non-credentialed staff member in contrast to hospital coding, which is typically performed by 
certified coders. Therefore, diagnosis code variation may be related to a lack of coding education 
or to insufficient physician documentation rather than an actual change in patient acuity. 
O’Malley et al. (2005) described the common practice of coders assigning ICD codes based on 







Coding Accuracy in Other Countries 
 Hennessy, Quan, Faris and Beck (2010) studied ICD-10 coded discharge records in 
Canada and discovered life-threatening conditions such as cancer are coded correctly more often 
than some non-specific diseases. The results showed an increase in the number of coded records 
but a decrease in the number of diagnoses coded. The research team theorized coders may have 
less time to code each record, coding practices may have changed over time, or physician 
documentation may have become less detailed. Regardless of the reason, they noted the need for 
professional coding training and a consistent management structure (Hennessy, Quan, Faris & 
Beck, 2010). 
 The availability of coding training and materials improved over time in the United 
Kingdom but the impact on variations in coding accuracy rates is unclear. The authors reviewed 
published studies and concluded diagnosis coding quality declined over time, but were more 
accurate for high prevalence conditions (Campbell, Campbell, Grimshaw & Walker, 2001). 
 After the 1998 implementation of ICD-10 in Australia, hospital discharge data was 
audited and revealed little change in accuracy with the transition to more detailed diagnosis 
codes (Henderson, Shepheard & Sundararajan, 2006). Cheng, Gilchrist, Robinson and Paul 
(2009) measured coding errors in Australia and identified poor quality of documentation as the 
most significant factor impacting coding error. Misset et al.’s (2008) review of diagnosis coding 
by intensive care unit physicians in France was consistent with prior studies demonstrating poor 
reliability when coders, physicians or hospital administrators selected codes.  
Changes in Risk Scores/Upcoding 
Kronick & Welch (2014) utilized the Medicare Enrollment Database, Common Medicare 




analyze changes in risk scores over this period of time and showed a faster annual increase in 
MA risk scores than FFS. Geruso & Layton (2015) used yearly county-level averages of risk 
scores and MA enrollment by plan type from CMS for the years 2006-2011 and found enrollees 
in private Medicare plans generated 6-16% higher risk scores than those in FFS plans. Lorence & 
Ibrahim’s (2003) cross-sectional exploratory study included survey data from U.S. health 
information managers, revealing variations in coding error rates across practice settings, 
population size, market area and patient volume. 
 Several articles examine the concept of reporting codes, which do not represent services 
rendered for financial gain. Bibbins (2007) notes the introduction of the concepts of “upcoding” 
and “DRG creep” in the 1990s. A report by the Office of Inspector General defined upcoding as 
“the practice of billing for a hospital stay more expensive than the one actually incurred” (OIG, 
1998). Synonyms for creep are misspecification, when the diagnosis used to order a test is not 
supported by the documentation in the medical record, and miscoding, which is assignment of a 
generic code when a more specific one is appropriate (O’Malley et al., 2005). Unbundling errors, 
which occur when different components of a diagnosis are reported separately rather than using a 
combination code, may be unintentional or deliberate (O’Malley et al., 2005). Kronick (2017) 
notes MA plans deny it is wrong to report more diagnoses for their beneficiaries than FFS ones.  
 Steinbusch, Ostenbrink, Zuurbier and Schaepkens (2006) studied the differences in case 
mix systems in the United States, Australia and the Netherlands and discovered market 
characteristics such as hospital size and financial situation contributed to higher risk of upcoding. 
They concluded there were fewer opportunities for upcoding in case mix systems without for-




 Nimptsch (2016) noted an increase in secondary diagnosis coding after hospital 
reimbursement reform in Germany, with most of the variation related to improved accuracy in 
capturing prevalent comorbidities in cases where coding was relevant to payment. Findings 
indicated patients in early periods might have been misclassified due to under-reporting of 
secondary diagnoses. 
 Lorence and Richards (2002) studied the effects of supervisors’ influence on coding 
practices, with 43.5% of respondents admitting management sought to promote coding 
optimization and 32.9% indicating their coding practices were influenced by specific payers. The 
researchers concluded a culture of pressure to misreport health care data based on profit motives 
exists in the United States and varies across regions. 
 Kronick and Welch (2014) reviewed risk scores for all Medicare beneficiaries and found 
the average MA risk score increased faster than the average FFS score, largely reflecting changes 
in diagnostic coding rather than increased morbidity of MA enrollees. The prevalence of the 
highest-paying diabetes HCC category increased from 2.5% in 2004 to 20.1% in 2012 among the 
top decile of MA plans, while diagnosis codes for heart attack and hip fracture showed little 
variation and was similar to or below FFS (Kronick & Welch, 2014). 
 In response to concerns about changes in diagnostic coding, the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 directed CMS to measure and adjust for coding intensity and in the 2010 payment year a 
3.41% adjustment was made to reflect anticipated differences between MA and FFS coding 
(Kronick & Welch, 2014). 
Summary of Findings in the Literature 
 Deliberate and unintentional reasons for coding errors exist. RA provides an incentive for 




codes may be a result of influence from a payer or supervisor and are typically related to a desire 
to increase a patient’s risk score or satisfy a medical necessity requirement for a diagnostic test. 
Unintentional mistakes may be caused by lack of coding education, insufficient physician 
documentation or haste.  
 The number of MA enrollees continues to grow, and overpayments related to inaccurate 
risk scores have cost Americans tens of billions of dollars (Schulte, 2016). Relying upon 
inaccurate diagnosis codes may also impact quality of care and patient outcomes. Because 
research typically focuses on hospital coding quality, it is important to study validity in physician 
practices to identify causes of diagnosis coding errors and strategies to address them. 
Understanding variations between diagnosis coding for the two types of Medicare payment 
systems, FFS and RA, should help to identify deliberate systematic upcoding. While litigation 
thus far has focused on health plans, physicians and practice management should be concerned 













 There has been little research on diagnosis coding variation in physician practices. 
Previous research has focused on hospital DRG upcoding. The objective of this study was to 
determine if diagnosis codes for Medicare patients seen in physician offices became more 
specific since the HCC model of RA was implemented. 
Study Design 
This study was a quantitative, retrospective review of claims data from the Limited Data 
Set of MEDPAR’s 5% sample from 2012, 2013, 2014, and the first nine months of 2015, as well 
as the Truven Health MarketScan® Medicare Supplemental Database from 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014, and the first nine months of 2015. The final three months of 2015 were intentionally 
excluded because the diagnosis codes changed on October 1 when ICD-10-CM was 
implemented. The MarketScan® database includes claims for patients with Medicare and a 
private supplemental insurance. 
 Claims for both new and established patient services, represented by evaluation and 
management (E&M) levels one through five, with a primary diagnosis of diabetes, hypertension, 
or chronic kidney disease (CKD) were selected.  Exclusions were all claims provided in places of 
service other than the physician office (place of service 11). The diagnosis codes chosen, listed 




without additional reimbursement. The dependent variables were ICD-9-CM codes for diabetes 
mellitus, hypertension and CKD, and the independent variables were year. 
Data Analysis 
Multivariate analysis was conducted to establish the prevalence of unspecified diagnosis 
coding and identify any trends in code selection over a five-year period, as well as explore any 
potential relationship between code specificity and one of the independent variables. ICD-10-CM 
codes 250.00, 250.01, 401.9 and 585.6 were designated as unspecified diagnoses, and all others 
listed in Table 1 were designated as specified. 




Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type II or unspecified type, not 
stated as uncontrolled 
250.01 
Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type I (juvenile type), not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.02 
Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type II or unspecified type, 
uncontrolled 
250.03 Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.10 Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type II or unspecified type, not stated as uncontrolled 
250.11 Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled 
250.12 Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.13 Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.20 Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type II or unspecified type, not stated as uncontrolled 
250.21 Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled 
250.22 Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.23 Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 




250.31 Diabetes with other coma, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled 
250.32 Diabetes with other coma, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.33 Diabetes with other coma, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.40 
Diabetes with renal manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.41 Diabetes with renal manifestations, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled 
250.42 Diabetes with renal manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.43 Diabetes with renal manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.50 
Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.51 
Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type I (juvenile type), not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.52 Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.53 Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.60 
Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.61 
Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type I (juvenile type), not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.62 Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.63 Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.70 
Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type II or unspecified type, not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.71 
Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type I (juvenile type), not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.72 Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.73 Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.80 
Diabetes with other specified manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.81 





250.82 Diabetes with other specified manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.83 Diabetes with other specified manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
250.90 
Diabetes with unspecified complication, type II or unspecified type, not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.91 
Diabetes with unspecified complication, type I (juvenile type), not stated as 
uncontrolled 
250.92 Diabetes with unspecified complication, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled 
250.93 Diabetes with unspecified complication, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled 
401.0 Essential hypertension, malignant 
401.1 Essential hypertension, benign  
401.9 Essential hypertension, unspecified 
585.1 Chronic kidney disease, Stage I   
585.2 Chronic kidney disease, Stage II (mild) 
585.3 Chronic kidney disease, Stage III (moderate) 
585.4 Chronic kidney disease, Stage IV (severe) 
585.5 Chronic kidney disease, Stage V 
585.6 End stage renal disease 
585.9 Chronic kidney disease, unspecified 
586 Renal failure, unspecified 
 
Limitations 
Limitations include the potential impact on data validity from incorrect and/or 
inconsistent coding, including underreporting of a particular disease state. The Medicare 5% 
sample only included claims from 2012-2015; therefore no comparison was made to the 2010 









 Billing claims from the Medicare 5% Sample and the MarketScan® database for January 
1, 2012 through September 30, 2015 were compared, and ICD-9-CM code specificity for CKD, 
hypertension and diabetes were examined.  MarketScan® claims data from 2010 and 2011 were 
also studied. There were a total of 4,476,263 claims with a primary diagnosis for one of these 
conditions in the Medicare 5% sample and 20,067,886 in the MarketScan® sample. The 
frequency of specific ICD-9-CM code utilization is listed in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Frequency of CKD, Hypertension and Diabetes – Both Data Sets 
YEAR 
Medicare 































2012 90.6% 94.8% 53.3% 76.5% 37.4% 61.5% 
2013 91.0% 95.4% 51.7% 77.2% 38.4% 64.6% 
2014 91.4% 96.0% 49.8% 78.8% 39.6% 67.1% 
2015 92.0% 96.5% 48.0% 79.2% 41.1% 69.0% 
 
 
 Comparison of average diagnosis code specificity, without regard to level of service, 
revealed an increase in both data sets for CKD and diabetes over the four year period from 2012-
2015. However, specificity for hypertension claims decreased in the Medicare 5% Sample, while 




Figure 2: Comparison of Diagnosis Code Specificity per Disease 
 
Chronic Kidney Disease 
 The Medicare 5% sample included 505,383 claims with CKD as the primary diagnosis. 
Of these encounters, 460,900 (91.2%) were reported with a specific ICD-9-CM code. The 
MarketScan® database included 3,375,107 claims for CKD, with 3,202,309 (94.9%) reported by 




Figure 3: CKD Specificity by Year in Medicare 5% sample 
 





 Analysis of the Medicare 5% sample data for CKD, in Figure 5 below, revealed specific 
diagnosis code use with level 1 E&M services of 87.8% in 2012, compared to 87.2% in 2013, 
85.2% in 2014, and 84.5% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific CKD ICD-9 
codes 87.9% of the time in 2012, 88.6% in 2013, 89.4% in 2015, and 89.4% in 2015.  Diagnosis 
specificity for Level 3 services was 88.9% in 2012, 89.9% in 2013, 90.3% in 2014, and 91% in 
2015. Level 4 visits for specific CKD diagnoses were 91.6%, 91.7%, 92.1%, and 92.6%. Finally, 
level 5 visits for CKD were 92%, 91.8%, 92%, and 93%. 
Figure 5: CKD Specificity by Level of Service & Year in Medicare 5% sample 
 
 Analysis of the MarketScan® data for CKD, in Figure 6 below, revealed specific 
diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 92% in 2012, compared to 93% in 2013, 93.7% in 
2014, and 94.1% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific CKD ICD-9 codes 92.4% 
of the time in 2012, 92.6% in 2013, 93.8% in 2015, and 95% in 2015.  Diagnosis specificity for 




visits for specific CKD diagnoses were 95.3%, 95.7%, 96.4%, and 96.8%. Finally, level 5 visits 
for CKD were 95.2%, 95.6%, 96.1%, and 96.8%. 
Figure 6: CKD Specificity by Level of Service & Year in MarketScan® sample 
 
Hypertension  
 Of the 3,377,967 claims for hypertension in the Medicare 5% sample, a specific primary 
diagnosis was included on 1,720,815 (50.9%) of these. Hypertension claims in the MarketScan® 
database numbered 39,415,604 with specificity on 23,145,839 (76.1%) of the encounters. These 




Figure 7: Hypertension Specificity by Year in Medicare 5% sample 
 





 Analysis of the Medicare 5% sample data for hypertension, in Figure 9 below, showed 
specific diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 52% in 2012, compared to 51.6% in 2013, 
50.2% in 2014, and 49% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific hypertension 
ICD-9 codes 51% of the time in 2012, 51.1% in 2013, 48.3% in 2015, and 46.4% in 2015.  
Diagnosis specificity for Level 3 services was 52.4% in 2012, 50.9% in 2013, 49.1% in 2014, 
and 47.4% in 2015. Level 4 visits for specific hypertension diagnoses were 54%, 52.3%, 50.3%, 
and 48.3%. Finally, level 5 visits for hypertension were 54.7%, 53.1%, 51.4%, and 48.9%.  
Figure 9: Hypertension Specificity by Level of Service in Medicare 5% sample 
 
 Analysis of the MarketScan® data, in Figure 10 below, revealed specific hypertension 
diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 66.5% in 2012, compared to 64.4% in 2013, 65.2% in 
2014, and 64.5% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific hypertension ICD-9 codes 




specificity for Level 3 services was 73.5% in 2012, 74.1% in 2013, 75.3% in 2014, and 75.9% in 
2015. Level 4 visits for specific hypertension diagnoses were 78.9%, 79.5%, 80.9%, and 89.1%. 
Finally, level 5 visits for hypertension were 80.4%, 81.4%, 82.7%, and 83%. 
 




 Diabetes was reported by a specific ICD-9-CM code on 892,913 (39%) of 2,289,643 
claims in the Medicare 5% sample. MarketScan® included 9,429,362 claims for diabetes, with 







Figure 11: Diabetes Specificity by Year in Medicare 5% sample 
 





 Analysis of the Medicare 5% sample data, in Figure 13 below, revealed specific diabetes 
diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 34.8% in 2012, compared to 36.6% in 2013, 38.3% in 
2014, and 38.4% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific diabetes ICD-9 codes 
53.3% of the time in 2012, 54.5% in 2013, 55.9% in 2015, and 57.1% in 2015.  Diagnosis 
specificity for Level 3 services was 35.5% in 2012, 36.9% in 2013, 38.8% in 2014, and 40.2% in 
2015. Level 4 visits for specific diabetes diagnoses were 37%, 37.6%, 38.6%, and 40.2%. 
Finally, level 5 visits for diabetes were 44.4%, 45.9%, 46.6%, and 48.7%. 
Figure 13: Diabetes Specificity by Level of Service & Year in Medicare 5% sample 
 
 Analysis of the MarketScan® data, in Figure 14 below, revealed specific diabetes 
diagnosis code use with level 1 E&M services of 55.6% in 2012, compared to 59.3% in 2013, 
60.5% in 2014, and 63.2% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific diabetes ICD-9 




specificity for Level 3 services was 61.9% in 2012, 65.6% in 2013, 67.4% in 2014, and 69.3% in 
2015. Level 4 visits for specific diabetes diagnoses were 60%, 62.8%, 65.7%, and 67.6%. 
Finally, level 5 visits for diabetes were 66.6%, 70.2%, 73.5%, and 76%. 












 This study was conducted to determine if diagnosis code specificity for Medicare patients 
seen in the physician office setting increased after the full implementation of HCC in 2007. 
Managed Medicare has grown rapidly, with an increased Part C enrollment from 13,702,251 in 
2012 to 21,448,250 in 2018 (“Total Medicare”, 2013) (“Medicare enrollment,” 2018). This 
change has led to physician reimbursement as more patients’ care is linked to the patient’s 
diagnoses rather than the number and intensity of services rendered. 
 The data indicated ICD-9-CM codes for CKD and diabetes became more specific over 
the four year period studied. The MarketScan® sample showed an increase in specificity for 
hypertension as well, but the Medicare 5% sample revealed a decrease in specificity over the 
same time frame.  
 The research supported our hypothesis that diagnosis codes became more specific after 
HCC implementation. However, differences in the frequency for each condition studied were 
noted between the two data sets. Both samples showed a specific ICD-9-CM code was reported 
for patients seen in the office for CKD more than 90% of the time. This may be due to the fact 
that the fourth digit of the CKD codes corresponds to the disease stage, thus making code 
assignment easier, and the definition of each stage is clearly defined by objective measures of 
kidney function. Hypertension, which had only three code choices, was reported with a specific 




Diabetes frequency was 39% and 61%, respectively, possibly due to the larger number of 
diagnosis code options for diabetes based on Type I or II and complications such as neuropathy, 
nephropathy, retinopathy, etc. 
 Reasons for increased specificity over the years may be a new focus on accurate 
diagnosis coding as awareness of new physician reimbursement models increased. Medicare Part 
C adopted the HCC payment model in 2004 and fully implemented it in 2007, along with a 
version for Medicaid patients, and commercial payers have followed. The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 included a similar calculation for payment in the individual 
and small group markets, and clinical quality measures such as the Healthcare Effectiveness Data 
and Information Set (HEDIS) also rely on diagnosis codes (Kautter et al., 2014). As these 
programs became more common, plan representatives began educating physicians and staff on 
appropriate diagnosis coding. This may explain the higher frequency of specific codes in the 
MarketScan® data set, which includes patients who have private supplemental insurance, than 
those in the Medicare 5% sample. CMS clearly anticipated a change in coding patterns and 
responded by implementing a coding intensity adjustment which increased from 3.41% in 2010 
to 5.91% expected in 2018 (Kronick, 2017).  
 Another possible factor is the initiation of Meaningful Use incentive payments for EHR 
adoption in 2011. These payments from CMS to physicians increased rapidly from 2011-2012, 
with a 337% increase in number of eligible providers receiving an average of $15,200 each 
(Settles, 2015). According a 2015 brief from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology, eight out of 10 physicians had adopted an EHR although only 64% of 
solo practitioners utilized one (Leventhal, 2015). Coding in an electronic record has advantages 




diagnosis codes rather than relying on a code book or a personal list of common diagnoses, the 
increased efficiency can be offset by inexperience with computer-related documentation and 
code selection.  
 Coding certification has become more popular over the last decade. The American 
Academy of Professional Coders, national credentialing organization for professional fee coders, 
reports an increase in membership from 60,000 in 2008 to more than 120,000 in 2012 (Blackmer 
& Ericson, 2012). The addition of certified coders to physician practices may have resulted in 
increased coding specificity. 
 The impact of the transition from ICD-9-CM to ICD-10-CM in October 2015 cannot be 
overlooked. The list of potential diagnosis codes increased from approximately 17,000 to 
155,000 as a result of additional granularity, with the intent of enhancing healthcare data and 
improving patient outcomes (Sanders et al., 2012). While services rendered on or after October 
1, 2015 are excluded from this study, many organizations naturally began to prepare several 
years before; particularly in light of the fact implementation was delayed a year. Therefore, 
physician practices who proactively educated clinicians and office staff may have increased their 
coding specificity as early as 2012 or 2013.   
Limitations 
 This study has several limitations. The study design is retrospective, and physicians could 
not be queried about the validity of the diagnosis codes reported and whether changes in 
specificity were unintentional or deliberate. The Medicare 5% sample did not include data from 
2010 or 2011 to compare with the MarketScan data from the same period, and data after October 
1, 2015 was not included. There may have been significant changes in coding specificity not 





 Research has shown overpayments related to inaccurate risk scores have cost tens of 
billions of dollars (Schulte, 2016). Patient diagnoses are a component of risk calculation that is 
under the physician’s control, represented by the ICD-9-CM codes chosen and reported on claim 
forms. With CMS’ increased emphasis on payment for value rather than volume of services and 
the growing popularity of Medicare Advantage, it is more important than ever to assess the 
accuracy of diagnosis coding in the physician office. The lack of research on diagnosis code 
specificity changes in the physician office setting leaves policymakers without sufficient 
information to fully understand the implications of the financial incentives for physicians to 
upcode for increased reimbursement. Even with the limitations noted above, this study is an 
important baseline measurement of changes in code specificity in the practice setting after HCC. 
However, further research is needed on coding accuracy and reasons for increased diagnosis 
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARIES 
 
Medicare 5% sample – CKD 
Year CKDSpec AllVisits PctSpec 
2012 120,176 132,668 90.6% 
2013 122,882 135,041 91.0% 
2014 123,727 135,370 91.4% 
2015 94,115 102,304 92.0% 
 
Medicare 5% sample – Hypertension 
Year HTNSpec AllVisits PctSpec 
2012 504,678 947,545 53.3% 
2013 475,825 920,403 51.7% 
2014 435,725 874,842 49.8% 





Medicare 5% sample – Diabetes 
Year DMSpec AllVisits PctSpec 
2012 231,371 618,354 37.4% 
2013 235,890 614,683 38.4% 
2014 239,692 604,665 39.6% 
2015 185,960 451,941 41.1% 
 
MarketScan® sample – CKD 
Year CKDSpec All PctSpec 
2010 400,359 428,416 93.5% 
2011 941,116 999,462 94.2% 
2012 491,138 517,834 94.8% 
2013 550,662 577,403 95.4% 
2014 544,632 567,620 96.0% 





MarketScan® sample – Hypertension 
Year Total Visits HTSpec PctSpec 
2010 4,347,983 3,215,364 74.0% 
2011 9,495,064 7,048,470 74.2% 
2012 4,622,302 3,536,538 76.5% 
2013 4,953,989 3,824,266 77.2% 
2014 4,796,329 3,778,193 78.8% 
2015 2,199,937 1,743,008 79.2% 
 
MarketScan® sample – Diabetes 
Year Totals DMSpec PctSpec 
2010 2,151,884 1,187,181 55.2% 
2011 4,823,594 2,722,698 56.4% 
2012 2,363,065 1,454,348 61.5% 
2013 2,538,261 1,640,866 64.6% 
2014 2,442,341 1,638,620 67.1% 
2015 1,138,955 785,649 69.0% 
 
 
 
